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Abstract
Most education around the globe is public. Moreover, investment rates in education as well as
schooling attainment diﬀer substantially across countries. We contruct a general equilibrium
life-cycle model that is consistent with these facts. We provide simple analytical solutions for
the optimal educational choices, which may entail pure public provision of education, and their
general equilibrium eﬀects. We calibrate the model to fit cross-country diﬀerences in demo-
graphic and educational variables. The model is able to replicate a number of key regularities
in the data beyond the matching targets. We use the model to identify and quantify sources
of world income diﬀerences, and find that demographic factors, in particular mortality rates,
explain most of the diﬀerences. We also use the model to study the role of public education,
and the eﬀects of the HIV/AIDS pandemic in development.
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1 Introduction
The provision of education around the world has three salient features. First, public education
is the predominant form of education. It accounts on average for 85% and 78% of primary and
secondary enrollment respectively, a fact illustrated in Figure 1 for a set of 91 countries. Second,
richer countries invest significantly more resources in education per pupil than poor countries. For
example, the US invests 200 times more resources per pupil a year than the average of the 5 poorest
countries in our sample. Figure 2 illustrates an aspect of this fact. It portrays the investment rate
in education, defined as the ratio of public expenditures in education per pupil to per-capita GDP,
against per-capita GDP. This investment rate diﬀers substantially across countries and increases
with income. The third feature is well-known: schooling attainment also increases with income and
diﬀers substantially across countries (Barro and Lee, 2000).
The purpose of this paper is to construct a general equilibrium model of education and human
capital accumulation that is consistent with the set of facts mentioned above. In particular, we
study the role public education and investments in education, as well as years of schooling, in the
formation of human capital and in the wealth of nations. Our analysis has two main distinctive
features. First, in our model young individuals face credit market frictions and the government
alleviates them by providing public education. This is a departure from the frictionless Ben-Porath
model that has been the focus of recent research on human capital formation, including Manuelli
and Seshadri (MS, 2005), Hendricks (2005), and Hugget, Ventura and Yaron (2006), among others.
Second, we calibrate the key parameters of the human capital production function by targeting
moments of the cross-country distribution of schooling and returns to schooling. Competing papers
instead only employ U.S. evidence to calibrate key parameters. Thus, our calibration strategy
avoids issues that arise due to the special nature of the U.S. educational system.
We devise a simple model that incorporates key features of the data regarding education and
development, and yet has simple closed-form solutions. This allows us to identify the mechanisms
at work and properly quantify the contribution of diﬀerent fundamentals, such as TFP, public
education expenditures, mortality rates and taxes in explaining income diﬀerences across countries.
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We show that the model performs well in other dimensions beyond the matching targets. For
example, although we only target the average return to schooling in the calibration, the model
replicates the overall distribution of returns better than alternative well-known models. Also, our
model replicates the prevalence of public education around the world even though private education
is also available in the model. Overall, we conclude that our model provides a plausible quantitative
theory of schooling, human capital, and incomes.
We then employ the model for several purposes. First, we compute the long-run elasticity of
output to TFP. As argued by MS, this elasticity increases substantially in models with endogenous
human capital and implies that given TFP diﬀerences result in larger income diﬀerences. We find
an elasticity of 2.4 in our model which is substantially lower than the one found by MS of 9. On
the other hand, our estimate is close to the 2.8 value found by Erosa, Koreshkova and Restuccia
(EKR, 2006) although using a diﬀerent model. Our estimate implies that smaller but still important
TFP diﬀerences are required to explain income diﬀerences across countries compared to models of
exogenous human capital. In contrast, MS’ large elasticity implies that no TFP diﬀerences are
required to explain income diﬀerences.1
Second, we construct human capital stocks for a set of 91 countries and compare the results
to existing alternatives. We find that our estimates are more disperse and significantly lower for
poor countries than the ones estimated using Mincer style equations. The reason is that Mincer
equations abstract from expenditures in education while our human capital production function
includes both years of schooling and expenditures as inputs. Since public expenditures per pupil are
positively correlated with per capita income, including diﬀerences in education expenditures across
countries makes human capital much lower in poorer countries. These findings are qualitatively
similar to those of MS and EKR, and quantitatively close to those of Córdoba and Ripoll (CR,
2004).
Our human capital estimates are significantly diﬀerent from Hendricks (2002) who finds rela-
tive minor diﬀerences in human capital across countries using earnings of immigrants in the US.
1This comparisson is between the complete models that include, among others things, variation in demographics
and in the price of capital.
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However, we show that both estimates can be conciliated if immigrants are positively self-selected
to some minor extent. For example, we find that a typical Mexican immigrant would need close
to 50% more human capital than a non-immigrant with same schooling for both estimates to be
identical. Our estimates are roughly consistent with those of CR who use a completely diﬀerent
methodology based on country specific rural-urban wage gaps to estimate human capitals.
Third, we assess the sources of cross-country income diﬀerences according to the model. A
simple variance decomposition exercise shows that the role of TFP in explaining steady state income
diﬀerences decreases significantly compared to models with exogenous human capital, from 60% to
34%. In addition, counterfactual exercises show that eliminating TFP diﬀerences would reduce the
world variance of log incomes by 48%, while eliminating diﬀerences in mortality rates would reduce
this variance by 51%. Finally, eliminating diﬀerences in the provision of public education would do
so by 18%. We thus find that TFP still plays a major role in explaining income diﬀerences, but
that mortality diﬀerences are at least as important.
Finally, we use the model to assess the eﬀects of the HIV/AIDS pandemic on long run devel-
opment. This pandemic has increased mortality rates dramatically particularly in Sub-Saharan
Africa. Contrary to some claims in the literature, we find that the long run consequences of the
pandemic are devastating for development. For example, the model predicts that if rates of infection
persist at the current levels, the log variance of income would increase in 28%.
Our paper is related to the recent quantitative work by MS and EKR regarding human capital
diﬀerences across countries using microfounded models of human capital formation. The first
paper derives the implication of a frictionless Ben-Porath model for human capital diﬀerences,
while the second builds upon a heterogenous agent model in the Bewley tradition. MS consider
pure private education, a feature inconsistent with Figure 1. Our model is similar to MS in its
use of a representative agent model and its treatment of demographic factors, but we focus on the
role of public education and credit market frictions in the formation of human capital, and our
calibration strategy is very diﬀerent. While MS calibrate the key parameters of the human capital
technology to match life-cycle earning in the US, we calibrate these parameters to match features
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of the cross-country distribution of schooling and returns to schooling. We arrive to substantially
diﬀerent quantitative results.
On the other hand, our model is similar to EKR in the treatment of public education and in
some aggregate results. The models, however, are very diﬀerent. In their model, TFP is the only
source of variation explaining income and schooling diﬀerences, while mortality rates, as well as
TFP, play the key role in our model. EKR do not consider the role of mortality rates in generating
diﬀerences in human capital accumulation across countries. In contrast, MS, Bils and Klenow (2000)
and Ferreira and Pessoa (2003) find, as we do, that these diﬀerences in mortality are important.
Finally, EKR calibrate their model to match moments of the cross sectional distribution of earnings
and schooling in the US, while we target the cross-country distribution of schooling and returns.
Finally, in our model permanent TFP diﬀerences do not aﬀect years of schooling while they
do in MS and EKR. This feature of their models provides an additional channel for TFP to aﬀect
income. However, it also implies that their models do not possess a balanced growth path, while
ours does. To the extent that a balanced growth path is regarded as a desirable property of a
growth model, our model provides a plausible theory of human capital and income diﬀerences. A
further advantage of our modeling approach is that we are able to obtain closed-form solutions for
most of our results.
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 lays down the model. Section 3
calibrates it and provides overidentifying tests. Section 4 reports human capital estimates. Section
5 presents the implications of the model for cross-country income diﬀerences as well as some coun-
terfactual exercises. Section 6 reports the results for HIV/AIDS pandemic. Section 7 concludes.
2 The Model
Consider an economy composed of I generations of individuals, competitive firms hiring labor and
renting capital to produce finals goods, and competitive mutual funds managing individuals savings
and the capital stock of the economy. Denote Ni, for i = {1, .., I}, the population size of generation
4
i, and N the total population. Schooling-age individuals (i = 1), or "children" for short2, can work
or go to school while adults (i = {2, ..., I}) only work. A period in the model last for T years, and
individuals live for a maximum of I · T years.
Demographics Of any given cohort only a fraction πi survive to age i. We define π1 = 1 and
πI+1 = 0. Life expectancy at birth is given by T ·
PI
i=1 πi. The population size of children satisfy
N1 = fN2, where f is the fertility rate of young adults (i = 2). Only young adults have children.
We focus on a steady state demographic situation in which total population is growing at a constant
rate. Since N
0
1 = fN
0
2 = fπ2N1, where (
0) denotes next period, then the common growth rate for
all groups along a steady state is:
N 0
N
= fπ2. (1)
Moreover, in steady state the age composition of the population is stable and described by (see
details in the Appendix):
ni ≡
Ni
N
=
πi · (fπ2)−iPI
j=1 πj · (fπ2)−j
. (2)
The Production of Human Capital Children’s human capital, h1, is assumed to be a fraction
θ1 of the average parental human capital, hp. Young adults’ human capital, h2, depends on human
capital investments undertaken during childhood:
h2 = z (χ+ s)γ1 xγ2 (3)
where [z, γ1, γ2] > 0 are technological parameters, χ are pre-school years, s are years of formal
schooling, x are educational expenditures in the form of final goods. Human capital for later
periods of life are assumed to be a proportion θi ≥ 0, i ∈ {3, .., I}, of h2. Thus, human capital
investments during childhood determine the whole path of human capitals during the individual’s
life. The parameters θi allow to capture the life-cycle profile of earnings while h2 determines its level.
For example, θi = 1 represents a flat life-cycle earning profile at the level h2. For completeness,
2 In the calibration below, "children" are individuals between the ages of 6 to 26 years.
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define θ2 ≡ 1.
Individuals’ Problem Individuals maximize their lifetime welfare as described by:
IX
i=1
πiρi−1 ln ci
where ci is consumption at age i, and ρ is a discount factor. Moreover, individuals face the following
resource and technological restrictions during their life time:
wh1(1− s/T ) = c1 + e, e ≥ 0, s ∈ [0, T ] . (4)
whi + (1 + r)ai−1 = ci + ai, a1 = aI = 0, i = 2, .., I. (5)
h1 = θ1hp, (6)
h2 = z (χ+ s)γ1 (p+ e)γ2 , (7)
hi = θih2 for i = 3, ..., I. (8)
where w = (1− τ)w is the after-tax wage, τ is a proportional tax on income, ai are savings at age
i, r is the net return on savings, e are private expenses in education, and p are public expenditures
in education per child. Individuals maximize over
n
{ci, ai, hi}Ii=1 , s, e,
o
.
The first restriction states that the after-tax labor income during the first period of life can
be used to consume or to invest in education. In particular, children cannot borrow. Equations
in (5) are the set of budget constraints during adulthood. The remaining equation describe the
accumulation of human capital. Notice that children receive public subsidies for education, p, which
enter directly in the constraint (7).
Although parents in our life-cycle formulation are not altruistic, they do help their children in
two ways. First, they provide them with an earning potential during their schooling-age years that
is tied to their own earning potential. This is a form of “unintended” bequest that allows children
6
to consume and invest in education. Moreover, it implies that individuals in richer economies
can consume and invest more in education than individuals in poorer economies. Second, parents
also help children by financing the public education system through proportional income taxes.
This form of “social” bequest reinforces the ability of children in richer economies to aﬀord more
consumption and investment.
Firms Output is produced by a representative competitive firm operating a Cobb-Douglas tech-
nology:
Y = AKαH1−α, 0 < α < 1,
where Y denotes output, K represent physical capital services, and H represents human capital
services. The firm hires labor and capital in competitive markets at the rates w per unit of human
capital and r per unit of capital. Profit maximization entails the following conditions:
w = (1− α) Y
H
, r = α
Y
K
. (9)
Mutual Funds Individuals deposit their savings in mutual funds (MFs). MFs own the capital
stock of the economy, and rent it to firms at the rate r. MFs operate a constant returns to scale
technology that transform q units of output into 1 unit of capital. Thus, q is the price of capital
in terms of final goods, the numeraire. MFs are competitive, pay proportional taxes τ on earned
income, and returns r to the surviving depositors. Without loss of generality, consider a single
MF that holds all the capital stock in the economy, K 0 =
PI
i=1Niai/q. Free entry guarantees zero
profits so that:
((1− δ) q + r (1− τ))K 0 = (1 + r)
IX
i=1
πi+1
πi
Niai,
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where δ is the depreciation rate of capital and πi+1/πi is the fraction of the population of age i
that reaches age i+ 1. Thus:
1 + r = (r (1− τ) /q + 1− δ)
PI
i=1NiaiPI
i=1
πi+1
πi
Niai
.
Note that for the case of constant survival probability, πi = πi−1, this equation becomes the more
standard expression 1 + r = (r (1− τ) /q + 1− δ) /π.
Government The government collects proportional taxes on capital and labor income to finance
government expenditures, G, that is, G = τ(wH + rK). Using (9) this equation can be written as
G = τY . Moreover, a fraction 0 < ε < 1 of G is allocated to public education: N1p = εG. Thus:
p = ετY/N1. (10)
Resource Constraints Gross output, which includes undepreciated capital, can be used for con-
sumption by all individuals (C), private education, government services, or to accumulate capital:
Y + (1− δ) qK = C +N1e+G+ qK 0.
Next period capital stock, K 0, is the sum of individuals’ savings divided by q. Finally, aggregate
human capital, H, is the sum of individuals’ human capital available for production.
Definition of Equilibrium Let y = Y/N , k = K/N , and h = H/N . The following is our
definition of equilibrium:
Definition A stationary competitive equilibrium for given taxes τ are prices w and r, quantitiesn
{c∗i , a∗i , h∗i }Ii=1 , s∗, e∗
o
, hp, k, y, and h, and subsidies p such that (i) given hp, prices, taxes,
and subsidies,
n
{c∗i , a∗i , h∗i }Ii=1 , s∗, e∗
o
solves the individual problem; (ii) given y, k and h, w
and r satisfy w = (1− τ) (1− α) y/h, 1+r =
¡
αyk (1− τ) /q + 1− δ
¢ ³PI
i=1Nia
∗
i /
PI
i=1
πi+1
πi
Nia
∗
i
´
;
(iii) hp = h∗2, h = (1− s∗/T )n1h∗1 +
P
2 nih
∗
i , qk =
PI
i=1 nia
∗
i , y = Ak
αh1−α, p = ετy/n1.
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Note that in a stationary equilibrium:
h =
Ã
(1− s∗/T )n1θ1 +
X
2
θini
!
h∗2, and (11)
h∗2 = z (χ+ s
∗)γ1 (p+ e∗)γ2 . (12)
2.1 Characterization of the Equilibrium
Individuals’ Problem We now characterize the solution to the individuals’ problem given prices
and policies. Optimal choices may imply corner solutions. We denote “public education” the case
in which e∗ = 0 and s∗ > 0, “no formal education” the case in which s∗ = 0 and e∗ > 0, “mixed
education” the case e∗ > 0 and s∗ > 0, and “no education” the case e∗ = 0 and s∗ = 0.
The following proposition describes optimal educational choices. All proofs are in the Appendix.
First define:
eρ ≡ IX
i=2
ρi−1πi; m ≡
eργ2 (1 + χ/T )
1 + eργ1 ; m ≡ (1 + eργ2)χ/Teργ1 − 1
The following assumption facilitates the presentation of the results (reduces the number of cases to
present), but plays no essential role in the derivations or in the quantitative work.
Assumption 1 eργψ ≥ χ/T .
This assumption guarantees that pre-school is not too important as to make formal schooling
unattractive. It is easy to check that under Assumption 1 m > m > 0.
Proposition 1 Given prices and policies, the optimal solution for schooling years, s∗, and private
expenditures in education, e∗, are:
s∗ =
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
0 for m > pwh1eργ1T
1+eρ(γ1+γ2)
h
p
wh1
−m
i
for m ≥ pwh1 ≥ meργ1T−χ
1+eργ1 for pwh1 > m
,
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e∗
wh
=
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
eργ2−p/wh1
1+eργ2 for m > pwh1
1+eργ1
1+eρ(γ1+γ2)
h
m− pwh1
i
for m ≥ pwh1 ≥ m
0 for pwh1 > m
.
Proposition 1 is illustrated in Figure 3.3 It typifies educational choices in three categories de-
pending on the ratio of pubic subsidies to potential earnings during childhood, p/(wh1). Informally,
the proposition shows that lack of public funding may prevent any formal schooling to take place,
and too much public funding may crowd-out completely private investments in education.
More formally, according to Proposition 1 the “public education” case arises when p > mwh1.
In this situation, individuals do not invest resources but only time in formal education. Since
the threshold level depends on labor income during childhood, the model predicts that poorer
individuals would be more likely to choose only public education than richer individuals. The
“mixed education” case occurs when the amount of public funding falls within an intermediate
range (m ≥ p/(wh1) ≥ m). Finally, the case of “no formal education” occurs when the public
provision of education is below certain threshold (p/(wh1) < m). In this case, insuﬃcient funding
discourages formal schooling. Under Assumption 1, the case “no education” cannot arise.
Proposition 1 also has the following implications for the role of public education on educational
outcomes. First, additional public funding increases years of schooling only if m ≥ p/(wh1) ≥ m.
Otherwise, years of schooling do not respond to changes in public funding. An interpretation
of this result is that increasing public funding of education does not aﬀect years of schooling of
individuals already in public schools, although it enhances their human capital. Second, private
funding responds less than one to one to changes in public funding. Specifically, |∂e/∂p| < 1
whenever e > 0. Thus, additional public funding crows out private funding but not completely,
despite public and private funding being perfect substitutes in the production function. The reason
is that public funding relaxes borrowing constraints which hinder private funding in the first place.
3A useful result to check the continuity of the choices at the threshold levels is to note that:
m−m = 1 + eρψ (γ1 + γ2)
(1 + eρψγ2)eρψγ1 (eρψγ1 − χ/T ) .
10
Proposition 1 also highlights the critical role of demographic factors in educational choices. It
states that individuals in economies with lower mortality rate, larger eρ, would choose more years of
schooling and larger private funding of education for any given size of the public sector. As we see
below, this mechanism turns out to explain most of the diﬀerential in schooling across countries.
Moreover, Proposition 1 also states that z, the learning ability parameter, does not aﬀect the
choice of schooling years or educational expenditures. Our model predicts that children do not
self-select into a pure public, private, or mixed educational regime based on their learning ability.
In particular, high ability children do not invest more years or resources in education than low
ability children.
Finally, Proposition 1 states that private funding of education depends on potential earning
levels (wh1) but years of schooling depends on the ratio of public education spending to earnings
(p/(wh1)). An important implication of this result, to be described below in detail, is that TFP
diﬀerences would induce diﬀerences in educational expenses but not in years of schooling. In this
regard, our model has diﬀerent implications from the models analyzed by MS and EKR, models in
which years of schooling depend on TFP levels.
Education in General Equilibrium The following proposition characterizes the educational
choices in general equilibrium. For this purpose, the ratio p/(wh1) can be solved from equations
(10), (9) and (11) as:
p
wh1
=
ετ (1− s/T +
P
2 θini/ (θ1n1))
(1− τ) (1− α) . (13)
Note that ετ is the share of public education in output (see equation 10). Substituting this result
into Proposition 1 yields Proposition 2. Proofs are in the Appendix. First define:
sH ≡
(1− τ) (1− α)m
(1 + χ/T +m) / (1 + eρ) +P2 θini/ (θ1n1) ; sH ≡ (1− τ) (1− α)m1 +P2 θini/ (θ1n1)
Proposition 2 The optimal solution for schooling years, s∗, and the share of educational expen-
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ditures in output, s∗H , are given by:
s∗ =
⎧
⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
0 for sH > ετ
(ετ−sH)eργ1Tm/sH
1+eρ(γ1+γ2+ετγ1/((1−τ)(1−α))) for sH ≥ ετ ≥ sHeργ1T−χ
1+eργ1 for ετ > sH
,
s∗H =
⎧
⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
ετ + (1−τ)(1−α)1+P2 θini/(θ1n1) eργ2−ετm/sH1+eργ2 for sH > ετ
ετ + (1−τ)(1−α)1−s∗/T+P2 θini/(θ1n1) (sH−ετ)(1+eργ1)m/sH1+eρ(γ1+γ2+ετγ1/((1−τ)(1−α))) for sH ≥ ετ ≥ sH
ετ for ετ > sH
.
Proposition 2 is analogous to Proposition 1. It characterizes educational choices in terms of
the size of public education. If the public provision of education is too large no private funds are
invested in education, while if it is too small then no schooling takes place. Proposition 2 also states
that years of schooling depend on demographic parameters and on public policy parameters but it
is independent of the TFP level A. As a result, diﬀerences in TFP in our model are not amplified
through years of schooling, as is the case in MS and EKR. Due to this feature our model possesses a
balanced growth path, while MS’s and EKR’s do not. On the other hand, in all three models TFP
diﬀerences produce diﬀerences in the “quality of schooling”: larger TFP increases human capital
through its eﬀect on educational expenditures.
Similarly, the share of educational expenditures in output depends on demographic and policy
parameters, but it is independent of TFP. For the cases in which s∗H > ετ , s
∗
H decreases with ετ
but less than one-to-one. This is because lower taxes increase private wealth and therefore savings
in the form of private educational investments, which partly oﬀsets the fall in public education.
Production in General Equilibrium Given the general equilibrium results for educational
variables, s∗ and s∗H , provided in Proposition 2, we can now derive some implications of the model for
aggregate output, and role of diﬀerent parameters in explaining output diﬀerences across countries.
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The following Proposition provides the solution for the equilibrium level of output. First, define
Θj(r) ≡
πjρj−1 (1 + r)jeρ
IX
i=2
θi
(1 + r)i
for j ≥ 2;
Φ(r) ≡
IX
i=2
ni
iX
j=2
(1 + r)i−j (θj −Θj(r)) ; and
Φa(r) ≡
IX
i=2
πi+1
πi
ni
iX
j=2
(1 + r)i−j (θj −Θj(r))
Proposition 3 The equilibrium level of output is given by:
y = A
1
(1−α)(1−γ2)
µ
k
y
¶ α
(1−α)(1−γ2)
µ
h
yγ2
¶ 1
1−γ2
(14)
where
h
yγ2
=
Ã
(1− s∗/T )n1θ1 +
X
2
θini
!
z (χ+ s∗)γ1 (s∗H/n1)
γ2 , (15)
k
y
=
(1− α) (1− τ) /q
(1− s∗/T )n1θ1 +
P
2 θini
Φ(r), (16)
r =
³
1− δ + α (1− τ) y
k
/q
´ Φ(r)
Φa(r)
− 1 (17)
Equation (14) in Proposition 3 provides the determination of aggregate and per capita output
in three components. The first component, A
1
(1−α)(1−γ2) = A
1+ α
1−α+
γ2
(1−α)(1−γ2) , collects the direct
and indirect eﬀects of TFP on steady state output. The elasticity of output with respect to TFP,
1 + α/ (1− α) + γ2/ [(1− α) (1− γ2)], can be itself decomposed in three parts. The first part
captures the direct eﬀect of TFP on output; the second part captures the indirect eﬀect of TFP on
output through its eﬀect on capital accumulation; and the third part captures the indirect eﬀect
of TFP on output through its eﬀect on human capital accumulation. This last eﬀect has being
recently stressed in the works of MS and EKR and its quantitative significance depends only the
size of γ2. If γ2 = 0, then equation (14) adopts the more standard form used in the works of Hall
and Jones (HJ, 1999) and Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare (KRC, 1997), among others.
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The second component collects the direct and indirect eﬀects of the capital-output ratio in
output. According to equation (14), the elasticity of output with respect to the capital-output
ratio, α/ [(1− α) (1− γ2)], is also aﬀected by γ2. This elasticity can be written as α/ (1− α) +
γ2/ [(1− α) (1− γ2)]. The second term captures the eﬀect that a higher capital-output has on the
accumulation of human capital and on output.
The third component, (h/yγ2)
1
1−γ2 , is related to the accumulation of human capital. In a
standard formulation with exogenous human capital (γ2 = 0), this component is just the stock of
human capital. If human capital is endogenous, this component captures the eﬀect of educational
decisions, which themselves are function of demographic and policy parameters, but independent
of TFP, as shown in equation (15).
Equations (16) and (17) jointly determine the capital output ratio, k/y, and the net returns
r. Both variables depend on demographic factors (πi, ni), years of schooling s∗, and taxes τ .
Importantly, they are independent of TFP, particularly because s∗ is independent of TFP as stated
in Proposition 2. The positive dependence of k/y years schooling is due to the fact that a larger
fraction of students reduces labor supply, increases wages for all, in particular for adults, and
therefore their savings. Thus, the eﬀect of schooling on the term k/y captures an extensive margin,
as more schooling reduces labor supply, while its eﬀect on h/yγ2 captures an intensive margin, as
schooling increases adult’s human capital.
Mincerian Returns Psacharopoulos and Patrinos (2002) have collected Mincerian returns for
a fairly large set of countries. Matching these returns provides a natural test for any quantitative
model of schooling. Mincer returns, or simply returns to schooling, are obtained from a cross-section
of individuals in each country using a OLS regressions of the type:
ln(di) = a+ bsi + cXi + vi (18)
where di are earnings of individual i, b is known as the Mincerian return, and Xi is a vector of
controls. In order to use these estimates, we need to derive the theoretical counterpart of equation
14
(18) in our model. This requires to reformulate the model so that individuals in a given cohort are
heterogenous in terms of earnings and schooling. Suppose only for this section that each cohort
is composed of a cross-section of individuals that diﬀer both in their learning ability, zi, and in
their discount parameter eρi. Yearly earnings during young adulthood, di, are given in our model
by di = w (zi (χ+ si)γ1 (p+ ei)γ2) /T . Alternatively, using Proposition 1:
di =
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
w
³
ziχγ1
³
γ2
γ1
wh1
T
´γ2´
/T for m ≥ pwh1
w
³
zi (χ+ si)γ1+γ2
³
γ2
γ1
wh
T
´γ2´
/T for m ≥ pwh1 ≥ m
w (zi (χ+ si)
γ1 pγ2) /T for pwh1 ≥ m.
Collecting terms one can write this equation more compactly as:
ln di =
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
a1 + γ1 ln (χ+ 0) + v1i for m ≥ pwh1
a2 + (γ1 + γ2) ln (χ+ si) + v2i for m ≥ pwh1 ≥ m
a3 + γ1 ln (χ+ si) + v3i for
p
wh1
≥ m.
where the terms [a1, a2, a3] collect all constant terms, and the variables vji, j = {1, 2, 3}, collect
the terms associated to zi. A linear approximation of the schooling term on the right hand side of
this equation around the steady state produces:
ln di '
⎧
⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
a1 + v1i for m ≥ pwh1
a2 +
γ1+γ2
χ+s∗ si + v2i for m ≥
p
wh1
≥ m
a3 +
γ1
χ+s∗ si + v3i for
p
wh1
≥ m.
(19)
Since according to Proposition 1, cov(s, v) = 0, then this expression provides a theoretical counter-
part of equation (18) in our model. We use this expression below to assess the model’s implication
for Mincer returns.
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3 Data and Empirical Implementation
3.1 Calibration
We now calibrate the model to match certain features of the cross-country data. For this purpose we
assume that the parameters {Aj , qj ,π2j , ..,πIj , fj , τ j , εj} vary across countries while the parameters
[α, δ, θ1,..,θI , T, γ,χ, z, ρ] are identical across countries. Individuals in the model are born at age
6 which roughly corresponds to the beginning of the schooling age in the data. Consistently, we
set χ = 6. Moreover, we consider 5 generations (I = 5), and a time period length T = 20. In
this specification, formal schooling takes place between the ages of 6 to 26, and individuals live
up a maximum of 106 years. Parameter α is set to 1/3 as in Mankiw, Romer and Weil (MRW,
1992), HJ, KRC, Bils and Klenow (BK, 2000), and others. Parameter δ is set such that the annual
depreciation rate is 0.06, which is the value assumed by HJ to compute the capital stocks that we
use. This requires to set δ = 1− (1− 0.06)20.
Calibration of πj and fj We estimate πij as follows. We take the US life table of total
population from National Vital Statistics Report by the US Census Bureau and, for each country
j, we adjust the US age-specific mortality rates to reproduce the life expectancy of country j as
reported by the World Bank. Mortality rates for ages 0 to 5 are adjusted using the World Bank
data on mortality rates under age 5. Mortality rates over ages 5 are multiplied by a factor which
allows to exactly replicate country’s j life expectancy. {πij}Ii=2 is computed, using the results of
the table, as the number of survivors at ages 36, 56, 76, and 96 respectively divided by the number
of survivors at age 6.
Fertility rates, fj , are computed using equation (2). According to this equation, the share of
population under 26 is given by n1 = (fπ2)−1 /
³PI
j=1 πj · (fπ2)−j
´
. We use data from the World
Population Prospects (2004) to compute n1 for each country.4
An important consideration is the year of the data used for these computations. Since the late
70’s mortality rates have increased significantly, particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa, due to the
4Given data restriction, our data on n1 actually corresponds to population under 24.
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HIV/AIDS pandemic. For this reason we choose 1980 demographic variables, which are still not
aﬀected by the pandemic and are likely more relevant to explain economic performance up to the
mid 90’s when the pandemic became more pronounced. We also conduct experiments below to
assess the long run consequences of the HIV/AIDS pandemic.
Figure 4 shows the demographic data and the calibrated values of fertility and survival proba-
bilities. A salient feature of the data is that survival rates are very diﬀerent across countries and
particularly low for very poor countries. The Figure also shows the estimated fertility rates relative
to the US. They also decrease significantly with income levels, exhibit substantial diﬀerence across
countries, and are particularly large for very poor countries.
Calibration of τ and εj In the model, G = τY . Accordingly, we set τ equal to the share of
government expenditures in GDP in 1995 from the Penn World Tables. Furthermore, we compute
εj for each country as εj = s
p
Hj/τ j , where s
p
Hj is the share of public expenditures in education to
GDP for 1995 according to UNESCO. Figure 5 shows the resulting tax rate, τ j , and Figure 2 shows
subsidy per pupil as a fraction of per capita GDP p/y = spHj/n1. While taxes decrease slightly
with income, subsidies clearly increase with income specially because the fraction of schooling age
children is systematically larger in poor countries than in rich countries.
Calibration of θ We calibrate θ = [θ1, ..θ5] to reproduce the life-cycle pattern of earnings.
For this purpose, we employ the estimates of BK. Using cross-country evidence on earnings, they
estimate that earnings at age i satisfy:
w(i) = a(s) · em(ex),
where ex stands for years of experience andm(ex) = 0.0512·ex−0.0071·(ex)2. Assuming 0 years of
experience for children, 20 for young adults, 40 for adults, and 60 for older adults, and no earnings
for elders, we estimate θ as θ = [θ1 = em(0)−m(20), θ2 = 1, θ3 = em(40)−m(20), θ4 = em(60)−m(20), θ5 =
0] which produces θ = [0.48, 1, 1.19, 0.80, 0].
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Calibration of γ1, γ2 and ρ To calibrate the key parameters —γ1, γ2, and ρ— we target mo-
ments of the cross-country distributions of returns to schooling and the average years of schooling.
Returns to schooling are obtained from Psacharopoulos and Patrinos (2002), while average years
of schooling in each country are obtained from Barro and Lee for the year 1995. Following the
derivations in Section 3, we compute returns to schooling as rs = (γ1 + γ2) / (χ+ s) for a mixed
educational system, rs = γ1/ (χ+ s) for a pure public system, rs = (γ1 + γ2) /χ for a pre-school
only system, and rs = γ1/χ for a no-schooling regime. The equilibrium educational system —
whether mixed, public, or other— is obtained using the model (more precisely, Proposition 2) for
diﬀerent potential values of γ1, γ2, and ρ. In these calculations, the values of other parameters are
set at their calibrated values already described. Importantly, the calibration of γ1, γ2, and ρ is in-
dependent of the parameter values described below (Aj and qj) and therefore robust to alternative
specification of those parameters.
Table 1: Calibration of γ1, γ2 and ρ
Data (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
γ2 - 0.100 0.200 0.250 0.300 0.350 0.400 0.450 0.500
γ1 - 1.080 1.035 0.969 0.893 0.803 0.722 0.637 0.579
ρ - 0.970 0.972 0.975 0.978 0.984 0.990 0.999 1.008
s 5.840 5.844 5.832 5.836 5.832 5.837 5.834 5.845 5.839
rs 0.097 0.097 0.097 0.097 0.097 0.097 0.098 0.097 0.097
sstd 2.890 0.986 1.042 1.124 1.239 1.403 1.554 1.658 1.633
rsstd 0.042 0.025 0.029 0.031 0.033 0.032 0.030 0.026 0.025
Table 1 reports statistics related to schooling and returns to schooling from the model and the
data for diﬀerent possible choices of γ1, γ2 and ρ. In these experiments, γ2 is allowed to vary
(between 0 to 0.5) and γ1 and ρ are chosen to match the average years of schooling (s) and the
average returns to schooling (rs). The table illustrates diﬀerent trade-oﬀs in the choice of γ2. For
example, γ2 = 0.30 produces the best results in terms of the standard deviation of returns to
schooling (0.042 in the data vs 0.033 in the model), while γ2 = 0.45 produces the best results in
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terms of matching the standard deviation of schooling (2.89 vs 1.658). In both cases, however,
the model falls short of explaining all variation in returns and schooling. We choose the following
parameters: γ2 = 0.40, γ1 = 0.722 and ρ = 0.99.
Calibration of qj Given parameters (α, δ, T, ρ, θ, τ j ,πij , fj) already obtained, and years of
schooling, sj , equations (16) and (17) can be used to solve for qjkj/yj and rj for each country.
On the other hand, HJ provide capital-output ratios for a group of countries for 1996. They
compute capital stocks using annual investments valued at common international prices rather
than at domestic prices. Therefore, their capital-output ratio corresponds to that of k/y instead of
qk/y, which allows domestic prices of capital, qj , to vary across countries. Given qjkj/yj predicted
from the model and kj/yj from the data, qj can be obtained.
3.2 Assessment
We now assess the ability of the model to fit evidence beyond the matching targets.
Schooling Panel A of Figure 6 compares schooling attainments in the data and in the model.
Although we only target the mean of schooling, the model is able to replicate the entire distribution
of schooling fairly well. The correlation between schooling in the data and in the model is 86%.
Years of schooling in the data range from a minimum of 0.69 to a maximum of 12.18, and in the
model they range between 1.73 and 8.55. Finally, the correlation between schooling and relative
incomes is 85.3% in the data, versus 82.8% in the model.
Returns to Schooling Panel B of Figure 6 and Table 2 compare returns to schooling in the
data and the model, as well as the predictions of two alternative models. The first model is that
of HJ who estimate returns to schooling as 13.4% for first four years of schooling, 10.1% for the
next four years, and 6.8% for the remaining years. The second model is one of the versions in BK
—their intermediate version with moderate decreasing returns to schooling. In this version, returns
to schooling satisfy the expression rs = 0.18 · s−0.28.
19
Table 2: Returns to Schooling
Data Model HJ Model BK Model
mean(rs) 0.097 0.097 0.101 0.1167
stdev(rs) 0.042 0.030 0.0256 0.023
correl(rs, rsmodel) - 0.345 0.345 0.302
correl(y, rs) —0.366 —0.773 —0.792 —0.680
min(rs) 0.027 0.041 0.068 0.089
max(rs) 0.288 0.168 0.134 0.200
Our model is able to reproduce the overall pattern of decreasing returns as income level increases,
and 71% of the dispersion of returns. Similarly to the other two models, our model overpredicts
the correlation between returns and relative incomes and underpredicts the dispersion of returns.
However, it is encouraging that our model is comparable to alternative models despite the fact that
our calibration only targets the mean of returns, while the competing models target the overall
pattern of returns.
School Regime and School Expenditures Panel C of Figure 6 shows the predicted equi-
librium educational system —mixed, public, etc.— for countries according to their relative income
levels, and Panel D shows observed public, and both predicted private and total shares of educa-
tional expenditures in GDP. The model predicts that most countries (82 out of 91) adopt a mixed
system, and 9 countries adopt a pure public system. For a subsample of 53 countries for which
information on private education expenditures is available from the World Bank, the model pre-
dicts that a significant fraction of total education expenditures, 65.4% on average, corresponds to
public education. This share is 77.5% in the data. For OECD countries, public education is on
average 85.7% of total education expenditures, and the model predicts it is 83%. For the US, public
education is 74.8% of total spending in education, and it is 87% in the model.
Finally, for the same subsample of 53 countries, the correlation between total education spending
per pupil as a fraction of GDP per capita and GDP per capita relative to the US is 62.7% in the
data, and 75.6% in the model. For the case of private education spending per pupil as a fraction
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of GDP this correlation is −22.7% in the data and −38.4% in the model.
4 Human Capital Stocks
4.1 A Cross-Section
In this section we use the model to estimate human capital stocks for a set of 91 countries and
compare the results to some existing alternatives. According to equations (11) and (12), human
capital stocks are given by:
hj =
Ã
(1− sj/T )n1jθ1 +
X
2
θijnij
!
z (χ+ sj)γ
¡
pj + e
∗
j
¢1−γ
.
We use this formula to compute human capital stocks relative to the US, which eliminates the
need to estimate z, a parameter assumed to be identical across countries. Notice that once the
technological parameters are obtained, this formula could map observables nij , sj and pj + ej into
human capitals. However, due to the lack of reliable data on private education expenditures we
utilize the model’s predictions on total expenditures to compute human capital stocks. We also
report the results when only available information on public expenditures is employed.
Figure 7 and Table 3 characterize six diﬀerent estimates of human capital stocks:
(1) those from our model, denoted CR;
(2) our model but using only public expenditures of education (CR-P);
(3) Hendricks’ (2002) estimates based on immigrants’ earnings in the US and no self-selection5;
(4) a version of BK that uses the formula h = ef(s)+0.0512·(age−s−6)−0.00071·(age−s−6)2 , where f(s) =
(0.18/0.72) s0.72. These estimates are similar to those obtained by HJ;
(5) MRW’s estimates based on schooling (here we use primary plus secondary schooling as argued
by KRC);
5Using Hendricks’ notation, we compute human capital in country c as wηc /w
k
c using the information in his Table
1. This measure of human capital includes both measured and unmeasured skills. See discussion in Section III.A in
Hendricks (2002).
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(6) Cordoba and Ripoll’s (CR, 2004) estimates based on rural-urban wage gaps.
Panel A of Figure 7 and the first two columns of Table 3 characterize the human capital estimates
obtained with our model using either total educational expenditures or public expenditures only.
Both estimates are highly correlated between them (correlation of 0.98) and with relative incomes.
Moreover, relative human capitals are systematically higher than relative incomes: while the average
relative income is 0.31 of the US, the average relative human capital is 0.42 or 0.39 of the US,
depending on what expenditures are used. Although the overall properties of both estimates are
similar, there are important country specific diﬀerences particularly for high income countries. For
example, Hong Kong’s and Singapore’s relative human capital fall substantially when only public
expenses are considered. Given that according to UNESCO, 93% of primary and 89% of secondary
enrollment in Hong Kong is in private institutions, it seems clear that some significant imputation
for private expenditures is required.6 For this reason, we favor our human capital estimates that
include imputed values for private expenditures in education.
Table 3: Estimates of Average Human Capital Relative to the US
CR CR-P Hendricks BK MRW CR2004
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
mean 0.42 0.38 0.75 0.58 0.48 0.51
stdev 0.29 0.31 0.18 0.18 0.24 0.24
min 0.09 0.05 0.48 0.30 0.06 0.07
max 1.15 1.21 1.11 1.00 1 1.02
corre(h, y) 0.98 0.95 0.88 0.87 0.85 0.83
Panels B and C of Figure 7 and columns 3 to 5 of Table 3 compare our human capital estimates
to those of BK, Hendricks (2002) and MRW. They are similar for high income countries but diﬀer
substantially for low income countries. Thus, while BK and Hendricks’ estimates imply relative
minor diﬀerences in human capital between rich and poor countries, our estimates, as well as MRW’s
estimates, imply substantial diﬀerences. The means of the estimates are 0.75 for Hendricks, 0.58
6Unfortunately, UNESCO does not report enrollment for Singapore or Taiwan.
22
for BK, 0.48 for MRW, and 0.42 for our model. Moreover, our estimates exhibit significant more
dispersion than the alternatives.
A further comparison is to the estimates of Cordoba and Ripoll (2004). They construct human
capital stocks for a set of countries weighting rural and urban estimates. They estimate urban
stocks using a standard Mincer approach (as in HJ) while rural stocks are Mincer type estimates
adjusted to account for the observed rural-urban wage gap in each country. Panel D of Figure 7 and
the last column of Table 3 compares our estimates to those of CR (2004). The 2004 estimates are
midway between our current estimates and those of BK, but both estimates provide a substantial
revision of human capital stocks relative to previous estimates, and they are at some extent similar
to those obtained by just taking average years of schooling relative to the US.
Finally, we can compare our human capital stocks with those of MS. Since they report average
human capital relative to the US by income deciles, we construct equivalent measures for our
estimates in Table 4. As shown in the table, our human capital estimates are consistently below
MS’s, proportionally more so for those countries below the 50th percentile. For instance, the average
country in the 50th− 60th percentile has 60% of US’s human capital according to MS, while it has
only 31% of US’s human capital according to our estimates. The only exception are those countries
in the lowest decile: they have 10% of US’s human capital according to our estimates, and 8%
according to MS’s.
Table 4 also reports BK’s human capital relative to the US. We use BK’s estimates to compute
the implied “quality” diﬀerentials in human capital across deciles for both our model and MS’s (see
last two columns). In particular, the ratio between our human capital and BK’s can be interpreted
as the relative human capital quality. As shown in Table 4, quality diﬀerences exists at all income
deciles in our estimates, while in MS they are only relevant for countries below the 40th percentile.
Specifically, while the average country in the 40th − 50th percentile range has about the same
human capital quality of the US according to MS, it has around 1/2 of the quality according to
our estimates. As noted above, the exception is in the lowest decile. Our human capital estimates
imply that a country in the lowest decile of the income distribution has a human capital quality
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around 1/3 of the US, while it is around 1/4 according to MS. In conclusion, our human capital
estimates imply quantitatively important adjustments, proportionally more so for countries below
the 50th percentile of the world income distribution.7
Table 4: Estimates of Average Human Capital Relative to the US by Decile
CR MS BK Quality index
Decile (1) (2) (3) CR MS
90− 100 0.97 0.95 0.90 1.08 1.06
80− 90 0.80 0.88 0.76 1.05 1.16
70− 80 0.63 0.79 0.71 0.89 1.11
60− 70 0.43 0.71 0.65 0.66 1.09
50− 60 0.31 0.60 0.56 0.55 1.07
40− 50 0.27 0.50 0.51 0.53 0.98
30− 40 0.23 0.43 0.48 0.48 0.90
20− 30 0.18 0.32 0.43 0.42 0.74
10− 20 0.13 0.20 0.38 0.34 0.53
0− 10 0.10 0.08 0.33 0.30 0.24
4.2 Self-Selection of Immigrants
To assess how plausible our estimates are, remember that Hendricks’ estimates reported in Table
3 are not adjusted for possible self-selection of immigrants, while BK’s estimates are not adjusted
for “quality” diﬀerences. Can the diﬀerences between Hendricks’s estimates and ours be explained
by self-selection? Figure 8 Panel A plots the ratio of Hendricks’ estimates to our estimates for
the subset of 62 common countries (under the name CR). This ratio spans from 0.93 to 4.25 and
has an average of 1.90. This is a much lower degree of self-selection of what Hendricks (2002)
argued was implausible. In particular, Hendricks argued against the degree of self-selection implied
in his Figure 2, which spans from 1 to 12. Such large degree of self-selection would explain all
7At this point we are unable to compare our human capital estimates to those of EKR, since they do not report
their estimates.
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cross-country income diﬀerences without TFP diﬀerences. In contrast, our series require Mexican
immigrants, the main source of immigration to the US, to have only around 50% more human
capital than non-immigrants which is just a small fraction of the income gap between the two
countries (of 4.36 times).
Our series imply that on average immigrants have 90%more human capital than non-immigrants,
while the income gap on average is 10.27 times. Moreover, our 2004 estimates imply even much
lower degrees of self-selection than our current estimates, as shown in Figure 8 Panel B (33% on
average and 19% for Mexican immigrants).
Table 5: Selection of Immigrants
Upper Bound (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
γ2 - 0.10 0.20 0.25 0.30 0.35 0.40 0.45 0.50
γ1 - 1.08 1.03 0.96 0.89 0.80 0.72 0.63 0.57
ρ - 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.98 0.99 0.99 1.00
ss 3.070* 1.39 1.68 1.78 1.84 1.84 1.89 2.02 2.17
ssmax 13.06* 2.27 3.24 3.57 3.81 3.94 4.24 4.74 5.35
ssmin 0.690* 0.46 0.46 0.46 0.46 0.46 0.46 0.46 0.46
ssmex 2.060 1.21 1.46 1.55 1.54 1.48 1.48 1.54 1.62
pss 0.810* 0.64 0.70 0.71 0.72 0.71 0.72 0.73 0.75
pssmax 0.999* 0.89 0.96 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.98 0.99 0.99
pssmin 0.320* 0.49 0.47 0.45 0.44 0.42 0.44 0.47 0.47
pssmex 0.760* 0.57 0.64 0.66 0.66 0.64 0.64 0.66 0.67
ss = self-selection (Hendricks human capital/our human capital), ss = average self-selection,
pss = percentile position of immigrant, pss = average percentile.
Following Hendricks (2002, pg 208-9), we can also estimate the position of immigrants in the
earnings distribution of the source country implied by our model by assuming that earnings are
lognormal distributed, and using the Klaus Deininger and Lyn Squire’s (1996) Gini coeﬃcients
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for income.8 Figure 8B describes these results. The series denoted Hendricks is the upper bound
he provided. Our series imply much lower degree of self-selection than the upper bound for most
countries. Table 5 reports additional exercises for the diﬀerent parametrization described in Table
1. Thus, for example, our benchmark parametrization (γ2 = 0.4) implies that the typical Mexican
immigrant is drawn from the 65 percentile of the earnings distribution. This is consistent with the
findings of Chiquiar and Hanson (2005), who find intermediate positive self-selection of Mexican
immigrants. They find that the typical immigrant is drawn from the 72 percentile. Table 5 also
illustrates that γ2 = 0.35 or γ3 = 0.4 produce the best results in terms of intermediate self-selection,
which lends further (and strong) support to our benchmark calibration.
5 The Sources of Income Diﬀerences
Development Accounting and the TFP Elasticity of Income A key parameter in our model
is γ2. Our assessment of the previous section lends support to our estimate of γ2 as it gives rise
to plausible predictions in terms of schooling, returns to schooling, and human capital estimates.
This parameter controls, among other things, the extent up to which TFP diﬀerences explain cross
country income diﬀerences. As stated in Equation (14), the elasticity of output to TFP in our
model is given by 11−α
1
1−γ2
= (1.5)× (1.6) = 2.4. This is a significantly larger elasticity than what
is obtained in model with exogenous human capital (of only 1.5). This elasticity is remarkably
similar to the EKR estimate of 2.8 despite the substantially diﬀerent modeling approaches. A
crucial diﬀerence is that our model explains schooling diﬀerences mostly in terms of demographic
diﬀerences, while EKR abstract from demographic diﬀerences and rely on TFP diﬀerences only.
On the other hand, our elasticity is much lower than the MS estimate of around 9. Their large
elasticity implies that almost no diﬀerences in TFP are required to explain income diﬀerences,
while important TFP diﬀerences are still required in our model. There are two diﬀerences in our
modelling approaches that help explain the diﬀerent results. First, TFP diﬀerences aﬀect the steady
8The Gini coeﬃcient of a log-normal distribution satisfies G = 2Φ
³
σ√
2
´
− 1 where Φ is the standard normal
distribution. Thus, σ =
√
2Φ−1
¡
1+G
2
¢
.
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state levels of both quality and quantity of schooling (e and s) in MS while it only aﬀects quality
of schooling in our model. An implication is that our model possess a balanced growth path but
MS does not. Second, our calibration targets cross-country diﬀerences in schooling and returns
to schooling. They instead target the earning gains between ages 25 to 50 in the US. Thus, they
assume that the technology of learning on the job is the same as the technology of learning in
school. We instead formulate and calibrate two diﬀerent technologies and tie the estimation of γ2
to schooling attainments and returns to schooling rather than to the life-cycle earning profile.
We now use our model to revisit the question of the sources of cross-country diﬀerences. The
first question we address is the relative contribution of TFP diﬀerences versus other sources in
explaining cross-country income diﬀerences. For this purpose we follow KRC and write equation
(14) as:
Y = A1 ·X1
where A1 ≡ A
1
(1−α)(1−γ2) and X1 ≡ (K/Y )
α
(1−α)(1−γ2) (H/Y γ2)
1
(1−γ2) . A1 captures the role of TFP in
output, and X1 captures the role other variables such as demographics, public education, and taxes.
We also follow KRC in using a variance decomposition. We thus define the contribution of A1 and
X1 as CA1 = cov(lnA1, lnY )/V ar(lnY ) and CX1 = cov(lnX1, lnY )/var(lnY ) respectively.
Table 6: Development Accounting
Value of γ2 CA1 CX1
Total K/Y H/Y Total
0.0 60% 15.4% 23.8% 40%
0.1 52% 17.2% 29.8% 48%
0.2 45% 19.3% 35.4% 55%
0.3 40% 22.1% 37.0% 60%
0.4 38% 25.7% 36.0% 62%
0.5 30% 30.9% 38.7% 70%
The first row of Table 6 reports the development accounting results in a standard model with
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exogenous human capital. In particular we use the BK human capital estimates described above and
assume γ2 = 0. According to this model, most income diﬀerences are due to TFP diﬀerences (60%),
a result consistent with the findings of KRC, HJ, and others. The second row of Table 6 reports
the results obtained in our model. Perhaps surprisingly, the role of TFP decreases significantly,
from 60% to 34%, when human capital is endogenous. It may seem surprising that the TFP
elasticity of income increases but its total contribution decreases. However, as Proposition 3 states,
not only the TFP elasticity increases but also the elasticity of the capital-output ratio increases.
The overall eﬀect is an increase in the role of other factors and a reduction in the role of TFP in
explaining income diﬀerences. These results contrast to those of MS who find that, once variation
in demographics and the price of capital are taking into account, no diﬀerences in TFP are needed
to explain income diﬀerences. We find that TFP diﬀerences are still substantial, although not the
main source of income diﬀerences.
Counterfactuals We now use the full model to assess the sources of cross-country income diﬀer-
ences. According to our model, countries diﬀer in their incomes due to diﬀerences in fundamentals
Fj = [Aj ,πj , fj , τ , εj , qj ]. Denote Fji the i element of this vector. A way to assess the contribution
of a fundamental in explaining income diﬀerences is to equate the fundamental to its US value and
compute the resulting reduction in income dispersion. More precisely, define:
Φi = 1−
var(ln yc(Fji = Fus,i))
var(ln y)
,
where yc(Fji = Fus,i) is the vector of counterfactual levels of outputs obtained when the parameter
Fji is equated to its US value, Fus,i. Thus, for example ΦA = 1 would mean that by equating
all TFP’s income diﬀerences would be eliminated. The results are surprising. The single more
important fundamental is the survival rate followed by TFP. According to the model, equating
mortality rates across countries would reduce the variance of log incomes in 51%, while equating
TFP would reduce that variance in 48%. The role of public education is also important. Equating
the share of education in the government expenditures would reduce income variance in 18%.
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6 The Eﬀects of the HIV/AIDS Pandemic in Development
As documented in the previous section, according to our model, mortality rates are a major deter-
minant of income diﬀerences. Although a general pattern of convergence in demographic variables
took place until recently, this pattern changed substantially with the HIV/AIDS pandemic. Panel
A in Figure 9 illustrates the changes in life expectancy between 1980 and 2003. Life expectancy fell
in many countries with already short life expectancy in 1980, while it increased in most countries
with already large life expectancy. The most dramatic cases are Botswana, Zimbabwe, Lesotho,
Zambia, and South Africa where life expectancy fell in 20, 16, 15, 13 and 11 years respectively
between 1980 to 2003.
A number of papers have tried to assess the short and long run eﬀects of the AIDS pandemic
in development within a general equilibrium framework.9 Young (2005) provides an assessment
for South Africa under the assumptions that the epidemic disappears completely within a 50 years
period, that savings rate rates remain unchanged, and that student time is the only input in the
production of human capital. He finds that per capita income will increase for generations following
the end of the pandemic. In contrast, Arndt and Lewis (2000) find significant negative eﬀects even
in the short run, and using a very simple model of human capital accumulation. Ferreira and Pessoa
(2003) and Corrigan, Glomm and Mendez (2004) study the eﬀects of a more permanent change in
mortality rates and find that the epidemic has significant negative eﬀects. Their human capital
models assume that student time is the only input the production of human capital.
We now use our model to assess the long-run development consequences of the HIV/AIDS
pandemic. For this purpose, we follow the process described in Section 3 to compute survival
probabilities for ages 6 and above using 2003 statistics on life expectancy at birth and mortality
rates under age 5. We feed the model with the new survival probabilities and calculate the predicted
levels of output, capital, and human capital. Results are shown in Figure 9. The model predicts
a 28% increase in the variance of log incomes mostly explained by substantial set backs in Africa.
9Econometric exercises include Bloom and Mahal (1997), who find no major eﬀect, and Ukpolo (2004) who finds
major eﬀects.
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Both physical and human capital fall substantially, although physical capital reacts more strongly.
Table 7: Long-run Eﬀects of the AIDS Pandemic
Ferreira-Pessoa Cordoba-Ripoll
Ratio of Ratio of Change Fraction Old Adults
y s y s h k MLE Ms π4(1980) π4(2003)
Botswana 0.56 0.29 0.24 0.18 0.40 0.09 -20.08 -3.88 0.17 0.00
Zimbabwe 0.65 0.38 0.28 0.35 0.43 0.12 -16.62 -2.87 0.11 0.00
Zambia 0.67 0.49 0.35 0.57 0.49 0.17 -14.18 -2.41 0.06 0.00
Lesotho 0.74 0.54 0.26 0.04 0.41 0.10 -17.58 -4.08 0.09 0.00
South Africa 0.74 0.57 0.44 0.76 0.59 0.23 -12.41 -1.90 0.15 0.00
Kenya 0.79 0.62 0.51 0.61 0.65 0.05 -9.51 -1.37 0.11 0.01
Malawi 0.82 0.66 0.45 0.31 0.56 0.28 -9.45 -1.80 0.02 0.00
Algeria 1.16 1.34 1.29 1.20 1.17 1.57 +8.74 +0.77 0.25 0.51
Tunisia 1.18 1.38 1.27 1.20 1.16 1.54 +8.92 +0.73 0.31 0.58
Egypt 1.2 1.38 1.39 1.21 1.22 1.80 +9.63 +0.91 0.18 0.46
Table 7 reports our predictions and compares them to those of Ferreira and Pessoa (2003).10
Our predictions for schooling are somehow similar (and reasonable given the reductions in life
expectancy) but our predictions for output are very diﬀerent, mainly due to dramatic falls in
capital stocks. The reason is that when individuals die younger, since they are at the upward
slopping part of their earning schedule, savings for retirement are dramatically reduced.11
10Results are not strictly comparable. Ferreira and Pessoa use 1985 demographics in their benchmark and 1999
demographics in the experiment while we use 1980 versus 2003 demographics.
11As observed in Table 7, our results are the opposite to those of Young (2005). Part of the diﬀerence is that he
assumes that the pandemic will completely and linearly disappear within the next 50 years. We instead assume a
more permanent eﬀect. In addition, Young does not consider the eﬀects on savings, but only on human capital and
fertility.
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7 Concluding Comments
Using a life-cycle model with public and private spending in schooling, we find that diﬀerences in
mortality rates are at least as important as TFP diﬀerences in accounting for the variance of log
incomes. In particular, elimination of TFP diﬀerences would reduce the variance of log income in
48%, while elimination of mortality diﬀerences would do so by 51%. In addition, the equilibrium
of our model implies a set of human capital estimates for all countries in the sample. We find that
these estimates suggest a larger dispersion than standard Mincer-equation estimates. In particular,
human capital in poorer countries is substantially lower.
In an apparent contradiction to our results, Acemoglu and Johnson (2006) find that increases in
life-expectancy since 1950 did not have much eﬀect on output growth. However, we view our paper
and theirs as complementary. First, the reduction in mortality that they refer to is mostly children
mortality. In our model, this would be the same as an increase in fertility rates and therefore
should actually decrease output. The reason is that having more children around dilutes public
expenditures in education and can actually reduce human capital per worker rather than increase
it, depending on the response of years of schooling. Second, since diﬀerent from Acemoglu and
Johnson we mostly consider adult mortality, our model is suitable for analyzing events such as the
HIV/AIDS pandemic, while theirs is not. Our results mainly suggest that understanding the origin
of diﬀerences in mortality rates is an important item in the research agenda in cross-country income
inequality.
31
Appendix
Demographics Note that by definition of πi one has that Ni,t = πiN1,t−(i−1). Thus,
Nt =
IX
i=1
Nit = N1t
IX
i=1
Nit
N1t
= N1t
IX
i=1
πi
N1,t−(i−1)
N1t
.
In addition, from (1), N1t = (fπ2)i−1N1,t−(i−1). Thus,
N1,t
Nt
=
1PI
i=1
πi
(fπ2)i−1
.
Finally,
Nit
Nt
=
N1t
Nt
Nit
N1t
=
N1t
Nt
πiN1,t−(i−1)
N1t
=
N1t
Nt
πi
(fπ2)i−1
.
These two equation can be written as in (2).
Solution to the Individual Problem Note that the set of budget constraints (5) can be written
as:
c1 + e = wh1 (1− s/T ) ;
IX
i=2
ci
(1 + r)i−2
=
IX
i=2
whi
(1 + r)i−2
= Θwh2 (20)
where Θ (r) ≡
PI
i=2
θi
(1+r)i−2 = 1+
PI
i=3
θi
(1+r)i−2 > 1. The individual problem can thus be written
as:
max
s,e,{ci}Ii>2
+ ln (wh1 (1− s/T )− e) +
IX
i>2
πiρi−1 ln (ci)
+ρπ2 ln
"
Θwz(χ+ s)γ1 (p+ e)γ2 −
IX
i>2
ci
(1 + r)i−2
#
+μs+ λe
where μ and λ are Lagrange multipliers. An optimal solution must satisfy:
s : wh1/T = ρπ2
c1
c2
γ1Θwh2
1
χ+ s
+ μ (21)
e : 1 = ρπ2
c1
c2
γ2Θwh2
1
p+ e
+ λ (22)
ci : ρπ2
1
c2
1
(1 + r)i−2
= πiρi−1
1
ci
for i = 3, .., I. (23)
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The last equation produces:
ci =
πi
π2
[ρ (1 + r)]i−2 c2 for i = 3, .., I (24)
Using this result and (20) one obtains:
c2 = Θwh2 −
IX
i=3
ci
(1 + r)i−2
= Θwh2 − c2
IX
i=3
πi
π2
ρi−2 (25)
=
Θwh2
1 +
PI
i=3
πi
π2ρ
i−2
.
Then, one can use (24) and (25) to write cj more generally as:
cj = Θj (r)wh2 for j = 2, .., I.
where
Θj(r) ≡
πj
π2 [ρ (1 + r)]
j−2Θ
1 +
PI
i=3
πi
π2
ρi−2
=
PI
i=2 θi (1 + r)
j−iPI
i=2
πi
πj
ρi−j
.
Furthermore, one can obtain ai as:
ai = whi + (1 + r)ai−1 − ci
so that
a1 = 0,
a2 = (1−Θ2)wh2,
...
ai = (θi −Θi)wh2 + (1 + r) ai−1.for i = 3, .., I.
Alternatively
a3 = [(θ3 −Θ3) + (1 + r) (1−Θ2)]wh2
a4 =
h
(θ4 −Θ4) + (1 + r) (θ3 −Θ3) + (1 + r)2 (1−Θ2)
i
wh2
ai = wh2
iX
j=2
(1 + r)i−j (θj −Θj) for i = 2, ..., I.
Moreover,
qK =
IX
i=1
niai = wh2
IX
i=2
ni
iX
j=2
(1 + r)i−j (θj −Θj(r)) . (26)
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Define Φ(r) ≡
PI
i=2 ni
Pi
j=2 (1 + r)
i−j (θj −Θj(r)). Then
qK = wh2Φ(r) (27)
Furthermore, using (9) and (11):
qK
Y
=
(1− α) (1− τw)
(1− s/T )n1θ1 +
P
2 θini
Φ(r) (28)
Moreover, PI
i=1NiaiPI
i=1
πi+1
πi
Niai
=
PI
i=2 niwh2
Pi
j=2 (1 + r)
i−j (θj −Θj)PI
i=2
πi+1
πi
niwh2
Pi
j=2 (1 + r)
i−j (θj −Θj)
=
PI
i=2 ni
Pi
j=2 (1 + r)
i−j (θj −Θj)PI
i=2
πi+1
πi
ni
Pi
j=2 (1 + r)
i−j (θj −Θj)
Interior Solution: s∗ ≥ 0 and e∗ ≥ 0 Consider first interior solutions (μ = 0 and λ = 0).
From (21) and (22) one obtains:
e =
γ2
γ1
wh1
T
(χ+ s)− p. (29)
Moreover, from (22), (25) and (4) it follows that:
p+ e = ρπ2γ2
c1
c2
Θwh2
= ρπ2γ2
wh1(1− s/T )− e
c2
Θwh2
= ρπ2
Ã
1 +
IX
i=3
πi
π2
ρi−2
!
γ2 (wh1(1− s/T )− e)
= eργ2 (wh1(1− s/T )− e− p+ p) ,
or
p+ e =
eργ2ψwh1
1 + eργ2ψ
µ
1− s/T + p
wh1
¶
(30)
where eρ ≡ PIi=2 ρi−1πi. Equating this expression to (29) and solving for s produces the optimal
level of schooling in an interior solution:
s∗ =
eργ1ψT
1 + eρ (γ2 + γ1)ψ
∙
p
wh1
−m
¸
if
p
wh1
≥ m. (31)
The last condition guarantees that s∗ ≥ 0. In addition, substituting this result into (29) produces
the optimal level of private expenditures for an interior solution:
e∗ =
1 + eρψγ1
1 + eρ (γ1 + γ2)ψ
∙
m− p
wh1
¸
wh1 if m ≥
p
wh1
. (32)
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The last condition guarantees that e∗ ≥ 0. Furthermore, from (7) and (29):
h2 = z(χ+ s)γ1 (p+ e)γ2
= z(χ+ s)
µ
γ2
γ1
wh1
T
¶γ2
= z(χ+ s)
µ
1− γ
γ
wθ1
T
¶γ2
h
γ2
p
Corner Solution: e = 0 and s ≥ 0 Next, consider corner solutions of the form e = 0 and
s ≥ 0. From equations (21), (25) and (4) one obtains:
χ+ s
T
= ρπ2γ1Θ
c1
c2
h2
h1
= ρπ2γ1Θ
wh1(1− s/T )
Θwh2
1+
PI
i=3
πi
π2
ρi−2
h2
h1
= eργ1(1− s/T )
and solving for s gives:
s∗ =
eργ1T − χ
1 + eργ1 . (33)
Furthermore, e = 0 is optimal if λ ≥ 0 or
p ≥ ρπ2γ2
c1
c2
Θwh2 = ρπ2γ2
wh1(1− s∗/T )
Θwh2
1+
PI
i=3
πi
π2
ρi−2
Θwh2
= eργ2wh1µ1− eργ1 − χ/T1 + eργ1
¶
= eργ2wh1 1 + χ/T1 + eργ1
or equivalently pwh1 ≥ m.
Corner Solution: s∗ = 0 and e∗ ≥ 0 Now consider a corner solution of the form s = 0 and
e ≥ 0. In this case, equation (30) is still valid because it does not use (21). Imposing s = 0 into
this equation and solving for e produces:
e∗ =
eργ2wh1 − p
1 + eργ2 if pwh ≤ eργ2.
One also needs to check that μ ≥ 0. From (21) and (25) this is the case if:
wh1/T ≥ ρπ2γ1
c1
c2
Θwh2
1
χ
= ρπ2γ1ψ
wh1 − e∗
Θwh2
1+
PI
i=3
πi
π2
ρi−2
Θwh2
1
χ
= eργ1µwh1 − eργ2wh1 − p1 + eργ2
¶
1
χ
= eργ1µwh1 + p1 + eργ2
¶
1
χ
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This inequality can be rewritten as m ≥ pwh . Thus, this case requires m ≥
p
wh and ργ2ψ ≥
p
wh .
However, one can check that the first inequality implies the second under Assumption 1.
Solution to the general equilibrium problem >From (9), (11) and (6) one has that:
wh1 = (1− τw) (1− α)
y
h
h1 =
(1− τw) (1− α) y/n1
1− s/T +
P
2
θini
θ1n1
(34)
Define bm ≡ m
1+χ/T+m
1+eρψ +P2 θiniθ1n1
and
ω =
²τ
(1− τw) (1− α)
Mixed Education Equation (13) states that pwh1 = ω
³
1− s∗/T +
P
2
θini
θ1n1
´
. For the case
of mixed education we then have that:
p
wh1
= ω
Ã
1 +
X
2
θini
θ1n1
− eργ1
1 + eρ (γ1 + γ2)
∙
p
wh1
−m
¸!
Solving for pwh produces:
p
wh1
=
1 + eρ (γ1 + γ2)
1 + eρ (γ1ω + γ1 + γ2)ω
Ã
1 +
X
2
θini
θ1n1
+
eργ1m
1 + eρ (γ1 + γ2)
!
m ≡ eργ2 (1 + χ/T )
1 + eργ1 ; m = (1 + eργ2)χ/Teργ1 − 1
Alternatively, one can use the definitions of m and m to rewrite this expression as:
p
wh1
=
1 + eρ (γ1 + γ2)
1 + eρ (γ1ω + γ1 + γ2)ω
ÃX
2
θini
θ1n1
+
1 + χ/T + (1 + eργ1)m
1 + eρ (γ1 + γ2)
!
Substituting the first expression into (31) and the second expression into (32), using (34) and
simplifying produces:
s∗ =
eργ1T hω ³1 +P2 θiniθ1n1´−mi
1 + eρ (γ1ω + γ1 + γ2) ;
e∗ =
wh1 (1 + eργ1)
1 + eρ (γ1ω + γ1 + γ2)
"
m− ω
Ã
1 + χ/T +m
1 + eρ +X
2
θini
θ1n1
!#
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or defining sH ≡ N1(p+e)Y = ετ +
1
3
e
Y , which uses (10), one obtains
sH = ετ +
(1− τw) (1− α)
1− s/T +
P
2
θini
θ1n1
(1 + eργ1) mbm [bm− ω]
1 + eρ (γ1ω + γ1 + γ2)
Corner Solution: e∗ = 0 and s∗ ≥ 0 The solution for s∗ is given by (33) and sH = ετ .
Corner Solution: s∗ = 0 and e∗ ≥ 0. For this case (13) produces
p
wh1
= ω
Ã
1 +
X
2
θini
θ1n1
!
and from Proposition 1
e∗
wh1
=
eργ2 − ω ³1 +P2 θiniθ1n1´
1 + eργ2 .
Moreover, using (34)
N1e
∗
Y
= wh
e∗
wh1
N1
Y
=
(1− τw) (1− α)
1 +
P
2
θini
θ1n1
e∗
wh1
so that
sH = ετ +
(1− τw) (1− α)
1 +
P
2
θini
θ1n1
eργ2ψ − ω ³1 +P2 θiniθ1n1´
1 + eργ2ψ .
Other General Equilibrium Results Per-capita output can be written as:
y = Akα (h)1−α = A
µ
k
y
¶αµ h
yγ2
¶1−α
yα+γ2(1−α)
= A
1
(1−α)(1−γ2)
µ
k
y
¶ α
(1−α)(1−γ2)
µ
h
yγ2
¶ 1
1−γ2
Moreover, notice that in a stationary equilibrium h satisfies, using (11) and (12):
h =
Ã
(1− s∗/T )n1θ1 +
X
2
θini
!
z (χ+ s∗)γ1 (p+ e)γ2
=
Ã
(1− s∗/T )n1θ1 +
X
2
θini
!
z (χ+ s∗)γ1
µ
n1 (p+ e)
y
y
n1
¶γ2
=
Ã
(1− s∗/T )n1θ1 +
X
2
θini
!
z (χ+ s∗)γ1 (s∗H/n1)
γ2 yγ2
37
so that
h
yγ2
=
Ã
(1− s∗/T )n1θ1 +
X
2
θini
!
z (χ+ s∗)γ1 (s∗H/n1)
γ2 .
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Figure 3. Optimal Educational Choices 
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Human Capital Stocks Estimates
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Figure 8
Self-Selection of Immigrants
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Figure 9
Predicted Long Run Effects of the HIV/AIDS Pandemic
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